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RACE QUOTAS AS A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, designed to encourage
hiring solely on ability and qualifications, provides that race, religion
and national origin are not to be used as a basis for hiring or firing.'
The Act's principal purpose is to obtain future compliance by elimi-
nating the causes of present discrimination through injunctive relief.2
However, the court can order appropriate affirmative relief, such as
hiring or reinstatement of employees and the payment of backpay.3
This relief can be granted by the court upon its own initiative through
its broad equitable power,4 or upon the request of the Attorney Gen-
eral." Since statistics could be used to establish a prima facie case of
1. 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964)(remarks of Senator Humphrey).
2. Id. at 7213 (interpretive memo of Senators Clark and Case).
3. Id. at 6549 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970)
provides: "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in a unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include
but is not limited to reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may
be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice) or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate. Backpay liability shall not accrue from a date more than
two years prior to the filing of the charge with the commission. Interim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated
against shall operate to reduce backpay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall
require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union or the
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment
to him of any backpay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or ex-
pelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged
for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title." (Emphasis added to
1972 amendments (P.L. 92-261)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (Supp. 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a) (1970)
provides: "Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that pattern or practice
is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein
described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in appropriate district court
of the United States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence
the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to such pattern or
practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including an application for a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or persons
responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full
enjoyment of the rights herein described."
Prior to the 1972 amendments suit could be brought only by individuals or by the
Attorney General of the United States. The EEOC could not bring suit. Individuals
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discrimination, many opponents of the Act felt that the affirmative
action provisions could be interpreted as mandating the correction of
statistical imbalances through the use of minority preference and
race quotas.' Sponsors of the Act countered that "quotas are in them-
selves discriminatory," 7 and "any deliberate attempt to maintain a
racial balance . . . would involve a violation of Title VII. ' 's It was
maintained that a statistical imbalance would be significant in deter-
mining whether the decision to hire was racially motivated, but the
relevant inquiry would be whether on a case by case basis discrimina-
tion existed.' These assurances did not allay the fears of those op-
posed to the Act who instead pressed for the insertion of section703(j)
which provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to re-
quire any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race . . . or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race . . . or
national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified
for employment by any employment agency or labor organiza-
tion, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organiza-
tion, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
could bring actions only when the EEOC was unable to resolve the dispute through
conciliation. The Attorney General could file in "pattern or practice" suits (§ 707(a)),
and intervene in any case which was of general public importance (§ 706(e)). Under
the amended Act, the EEOC may bring suit (§ 706(f)(1)); the Attorney General may
sue governments; and the EEOC also has the power to bring "pattern or practice"
suits. There will be concurrent jurisdiction over pattern or practice suits but on March
23, 1974, the Attorney General's jurisdiction over all Title VII cases ceases, except
against governmental agencies (§ 707(e)).
6. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOKLYN L. REv. 62, 76 (1965). Senator Lesster Hill remarked "[n]on-discrimination
is no longer sufficient, preferential treatment is demanded. It is to preferential treat-
ment as embodied in this bill, that I most vigorously object." 110 CONG. REC. 488 (Jan.
1964).
7. 110 CONG. REc. 6997 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark, Floor Manager).
8. 110 CONG. REc. 6992 (1964). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 6563 (remarks of Rep.
Kuchel). "It (the EEOC) would have no authority to issue orders to anyone. Only a
Federal court could do that, and only after it had been established in that court that
discrimination because of race. . . had in fact occurred. . . . But the important point
• . . is that the court cannot order preferential hiring or promotion consideration for
any particular race . . . . Its power is solely limited to ordering an end to discrimina-
tion which is in fact occurring . . . . [T]he bill now before us . . . is color blind."
9. Id.
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training program, in comparison with the total number or percen-
tage of persons of such race .. .or national origin in any com-
munity, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.
The purpose of this section was clearly to prohibit the use of any
quota system or plan which used race as a criterion for determining
employment. When section 703(a),"1 the general anti-discrimination
provision, is read in conjunction with 703(j), this seems to give even
greater support to the argument that the Act is "color-blind." It
forbids discrimination in employment and this would necessarily in-
clude discrimination against whites as well as minority groups.
Apart from section 703(j) the use of quotas raises constitutional
questions. When such classifications are used, compelling justifica-
tion must be demonstrated, since racial classifications are subject to
"rigid scrutiny"" under the fourteenth amendment. However, such
justification has been found in non-Title VII cases.'" An example is
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 3 a discrimina-
tory housing case, wherein it was stated:
What we have said may require classification by race. That is
something which the Constitution usually forbids, not because it
is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one
which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the
purpose of maintaining a racial inequality. Where it is drawn for
the purpose of achieving equality it will be allowed, and to the
extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race, it will
be required. 4
The courts have seemingly accepted the fact that quotas involve
some degree of reverse discrimination, but apparently find no consti-
tutional bar since they act in a benign manner to restore equal treat-
ment. One writer 5 has suggested that if quotas were subjected to the
10. The relevant part of section 2000e-2(a) (1964) provides: "It shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; .... "
11. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
12. Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelop. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d
22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967).
13. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
14. Id. at 931-32.
15. Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis
of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84 (1971).
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"rigid scrutiny" test established in Loving v. Virginia," they would
probably pass. A racial classification is necessary'7 because it is the
only practical way to define a group that has been victimized in the
past and the overriding justification that the courts require for racial
classifications" is met as the benefits being conferred will far out-
weigh the detriment to the few whites likely to be discriminated
against." The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the use of
ratios in faculty desegregation cases. In United States v. Montgomery
County Board of Education,2" the court approved a district court's
order holding that in certain schools the ratio of black to white teach-
ers was to be the same as throughout the system."' This was to be
accomplished through specific ratios designed to remedy past dis-
criminatory racial assignments." Thus, if quotas are constitutional in
this context they should also be constitutional in the employment
area.
Resolution of constitutional doubts through the doctrine of be-
nign discrimination does not overcome section 703(j) which despite
its clear wording and intent has not resulted in a ban on the use of
quotas. The term "race quota" has not been defined by the courts,
and until recently 3 there has been a judicial reluctance to use the
term. Instead such euphemisms as "hiring ratio" and "goal" have
been substituted. A quota is a requirement that an employer hire a
certain percentage of minority members either by hiring one black for
every white (alternating ratio or referral), or by successively filling
positions with minority applicants until a certain number is attained
(absolute minority preference). The foundation for the use of quotas
was laid in Louisiana v. United States,"' a voting rights case, where
16. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
17. Racial classifications must be shown to be necessary which includes a demon-
stration that no acceptable alternative to racial classification exists. See, e.g., Lea v.
Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
18. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
19. Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis
of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 84, 99-100 (1971).
20. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
21. Id. at 232.
22. Id. at 236.
23. See Bridgeport Guardian, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Com-
mission, 354 F. Supp. 778, 798 (D. Conn. 1973): "Much of the controversy in this area
has concerned the difference between quota hiring to remedy past discrimination and
some arguably less rigid approach involving affirmative action toward a goal. Ulti-
mately the distinction becomes illusory. As the time nears to reach the goal, a member
of the discriminated group must be hired in preference to a majority group person as
often as is required to meet the goal. A quota, for all its unhappy connotations, is
simply a recognition of reality encountered in reaching a goal." (Emphasis added.)
24. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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the Supreme Court upheld a district court's order enjoining the use
of a discriminatory qualification test and held that a new citizenship
test would have to apply to all registered voters. The Court did not
mention quotas specifically but the language employed in upholding
the district court's order has been used to give the Act retrospective
application in Title VII cases:
We bear in mind that the court has not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will as far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of past as well as bar like discrimination
in the future.2 '
The district courts have frequently applied this language to avert
the legislative intendment of section 703(j). It has been held that this
section cannot be construed as a ban on eliminating the present ef-
fects of past discrimination and eliminating future discrimination.2"
Some courts have maintained that section 703(j) was enacted to elim-
inate preferential treatment solely because of a racial imbalance ex-
isting at the effective date of the Act.27 In other words, preferential
treatment is not justified merely because of an existing racial imbal-
ance, but when coupled with present discrimination, such treatment
is allowable and in many cases required. Other courts held that when
703(j) is read in conjunction with 703(c)28 and the affirmative relief
sections of the Act, preferential treatment is not proscribed and any
other interpretation would nullify the purposes of the Act. 9 The pur-
pose of the Act was to eliminate discrimination in employment, and
Congress was aware of the effects of past discrimination, but legisla-
tive intent was directed at future compliance. Nothing in the Act's
history indicates that Congress intended to implement the Act by
employing some reverse discrimination against whites. Indeed, the
25. Id. at 154. (Emphasis added.) See also Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). (The court in discussing the enactment of Title VII, held
that Congress has "not intended to freeze an entire generation of Negro(es) . . . into
discriminatory patterns that existed before the act.")
26. Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n., 347 F. Supp.
169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Supp. 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970),
provides that it will be unlawful for any labor organization to discriminate in hiring
and in availability of employment opportunities for members and applicants because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
29. United States v. Local :38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
(hwied. 4W0 U.S. 943 (1970). See also United States v. Local A6, Ironworkers Union,
443 V.2d 544, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1971).
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opposite is true."' The restrictive interpretation given section 703(j)
by the courts in order to combat the present effects of past discrimi-
nation is, therefore, a liberal one.3"
Statistics are used to establish a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination.3 2 They are more than just a relevant factor in determin-
ing whether there has been discrimination in a particular case. If any
employer or union cannot rebut the inference established by a statist-
ical imbalance, he is held to have violated the Act. Quotas are a
means of ending the statistical imbalance. Any remedy must end the
imbalance or the remedy would itself be discriminatory. Thus, quotas
remain in effect only until the past vestiges of discrimination are
removed. 33 It would be useful to examine the exact context in which
quotas have been granted to see in what direction the courts are
moving and some of the problems encountered.
Labor union cases have usually arisen in connection with dis-
criminatory hiring practices in their referral programs. For example,
if a union is the exclusive bargaining agent in a particular industry,
then it will usually operate a referral system at its office through
which it furnishes or approves each worker hired by the contractors
in that industry. If all of the union members are white and one of the
qualifications a new worker needs before the union will refer him is
that he be a relative of a union member, then this would be a discrim-
inatory referral practice. Qualifications for entry into union training
programs might also discriminate against minority members in simi-
lar ways. The first case in this area was Local 53, Asbestos Workers
v. Volger.34 To correct defendant union's discriminatory referral prac-
tices, the court affirmed the district court's order admitting the four
minority applicants who were discriminated against, referred nine
others and ordered alternating black and white referrals until objec-
30. See Griggs v. Duke Pow. Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)(where the Supreme
Court in discussing the act said, "Discriminatory preference for any group, minority
or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has prescribed.") The legislative
intent, i.e., a restrictive reading of section 703(j), was observed and followed in some
of the earlier cases arising under the Act. See, e.g., United States v. Local 38, IBEW,
59 CCH Lab. ('as. 9226 (N.D. Ohio 1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); United
States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Dobbins v. Local 212,
IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). These cases have not been followed.
31. In the course of the debates on amending the Act, Congress gave its approval
to this interpretation of section 703(j) and endorsed the affirmative relief granted both
under Executive Order 11246 and in the Title VII cases by voting down two amend-
ments to section 703(j) which would have abolished similar relief in the future. See
118 CONG. REc. 706 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1972); Id. at 2276 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972).
32. Bing v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1971).
33. Swan v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1971).
34. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
19741
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
tive membership criteria were developed.15 In United States v. Iron-
worker's Local 86,36 the union was ordered to offer immediate job
referrals to qualified minority applicants who had been discriminated
against and to select and indenture sufficient black applicants to
meet a judicially imposed ceiling requirement of thirty percent." The
Second Circuit in United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers,
Local'46, ' upheld the district court's order creating an office of ad-
ministrator which would issue work permits on a one-for-one basis
with the goal of achieving a racial balance in the work force. In United
States v. Local 212, IBE W, 3 the court held that the union must
participate with the Journeyman's Employment Training Program
where blacks were given a preference over whites with equal or greater
qualifications and imposed a mandatory black membership quota of
eleven percent on the union. Within six years the courts have broad-
ened their scope of relief to include not only quotas, but have
achieved specific racial balances,4" and preferred less qualified
blacks.
Cases involving unfair employment in state and local govern-
ment4' are now covered by Title VII as well as sections 1981 and 1983
35. Id. at 1054. See United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532
(W.D.N.C. 1970) (defendant was ordered to hire six blacks over the road drivers and
any new drivers in a one-for-one ratio); United States v. Local 10, Sheetmetal Workers,
3 CCH E.P.D. 8068 (D.N.J. 1970) (temporary apprentices were to be referred on a one-
for-oe la)is).
36. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
37. See United States v. Local 357, IBEW, 6 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 388 (D. Nev. 1973)
(one-for-three applicants selected by the Apprenticeship Committee were to be minor-
ity members until twelve and one-half percent of the designated unit was black);
United States v. Local 10, Sheetmetal Workers, 6 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 1036 (N.J. 1973)
(apprenticeship committee required to indenture three blacks for every five applicants
accepted); Sims v. Local 65, Sheetmetal Workers, 353 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio
1972)(where a priority pool of qualified minority applicants was ordered with appoint-
ments to be made to the training program on a one-for-one basis); Buckner v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (there an academic pre-
apprenticeship training program was ordered for blacks with admission to the appren-
ticeship program on a one-for-one basis. Blacks who had previously passed the test and
not been selected would also be given preference.)
38. 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2773 (1973).
39. 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973).
40. A quota need not necessarily achieve a racial balance which approximates
minority representation in a particular job category with its proportion of the popula-
tion. For example, if there are 535 jobs in a particular department and no minority
employees in a city with 6.4 percent minority population, to achieve a racial balance
there should be 34 minority workers in the department. But it is within the trial court's
discretion to refer only twenty members. See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
41. Vulcan Society v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 6 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 1045 (2d Cir. 1973)
(interim relief on a one-for-three basis ordered where only five percent of the depart-
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of the United States Code.42 The cases brought under the old civil
rights acts constitute a body precedent not necessarily binding on
Title VII actions, but one which the courts find persuasive.43 Two
problems have arisen in this area: the granting of an absolute minor-
ity preference and the use of quotas in filling supervisory positions.
On rehearing in Carter v. Gallagher," a 1981 and 1983 action
which specifically made reference to Title VII remedies, the Eighth
Circuit, sitting en banc, modified its former decision which had re-
fused to grant an absolute minority preference for twenty workers in
the Minneapolis fire department; that is, that the next twenty per-
sons hired had to be minority members, in a department that for-
merly had none. The court reasoned that absolute preference would
discriminate against better qualified whites and be violative of the
fourteenth amendment.45 Instead, the court ordered that one out of
the three new employees be minority members until twenty were
hired and that this did not constitute a quota system since, when the
twenty were hired,'" hiring would be on a color-blind basis." Reverse
ment were minority members in a city with a thirty-two percent minority population);
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (priority pool established with selections
to be made on a one-for-one ratio); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala.
1972)(one-for-one); Arnold v. Ballard, 6 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 287 (N.D. Ohio 1973)(one-
for-one). See also Smiley v. City of Montgomery, 350 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Ala.
1972)(government plan calling for racial balance).
42. Section 2000e(b) of Title 42 was amended by Public Law 92-261, section 2(2),
so as to make the term "employer" encompass state and local governments.
43. See Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 848 (1972). See also Smiley v. City of
Montgomery, 350 F. Supp. 451, 456 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (where the court held that the
Civil Rights Acts and Title VII should be construed together).
44. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1973). See Erie Human
Rel. Comm'n v. Tullo, 357 F. Supp. 422 (W.D. Pa. 1973)(where the court ordered a
one-for-one ratio until demographic parity was achieved).
45. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1971).
46. Id. at 331. The court felt the one-for-one ratios should be limited to cities with
a greater minority population than Minneapolis.
47. Id. at 330. But see Harper v. Kloster, 6 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 880 (4th Cir. 1973).
The court's order, inter alia, invalidated a discriminatory entrance and promotion
exam and ordered that the predominantly black city residents be given a preference
in filling vacancies in the Baltimore Fire Department. The court specifically rejected
fixed quotas for various categories of employees for reasons given by the district judge:
"As a result of the suspicion with which the law views racial classifications, and the
fact that the Supreme Court has yet to address the matter, racial employment quotas
may not be valid ingredients in relief. . . .A conclusion of unconstitutionality is not
necessary to cause the court to reject a remedy so at odds with the spirit of the Civil
Rights Act." The court concluded the discussion, "[nlo sufficient compelling need
exists for the imposition of quotas. . .. Because effective relief can be granted without
resort to this device, the court will avoid it." Harper v. Mayor and City Council, 359
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discrimination was not discussed by the court in this context, but as
the minority population of the city was six percent, the decree neces-
sarily involved some discrimination against whites. When the pre-
scribed ratio is greater than the proportion of minority to whites in
the population as a whole, the minority group is necessarily pre-
ferred.4" Apparently the majority felt that such preference is not con-
stitutionally objectionable while absolute preference would be. Yet
some reverse discrimination is undoubtedly involved in other forms
of relief as in the one-for-one referrals.4" The courts seem to be dealing
in degrees of reverse discrimination but have yet to clearly draw the
lines between permissible and impermissible preferences.
Using quotas in supervisory positions is another problem area
presented in these cases. The Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill5' upheld a one-for-three ratio for entry level positions in the
Philadelphia police department, but a similar quota for supervisory
positions was not enforced seemingly due only to the fact that the
promotion test was not proven discriminatory. The court did not
draw any distinction between the two types of quotas. The court
found that a promotion test was not discriminatory in Allen v. City
of Mobile.5 The dissent, however, urged that not only was the test
discriminatory,52 but also that promotions during the interim period
(while a valid test was being drafted) should be made on a percentage
basis in order to eliminate past discrimination, with the precise for-
F. Supp. 1187, 1214 (D.C. Md. 1973). Morrow v. Crisler, 5 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 934 (5th
Cir. 1973). In this case the majority specifically refused to meet the question of whether
"minority preference" or "quota hiring" should have been granted. The court did not
discuss the constitutionality of such relief but held that it deserved "serious considera-
tion." The court upheld the district court's order enjoining the discrimination in the
Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol. Only two of its 27 bureaus had any black employ-
ees and no black employees were being hired. The district court's order enjoined
discrimination in processing applications; forbade giving preference to relatives of
employees; and forbade using recruiting films showing only whites in responsible posi-
tions. The department was affirmatively ordered to recruit blacks and to keep records
of all hirings for a three to five year period. It is clear that under similar circumstances
quotas have been ordered both in the Fifth Circuit, Local 53, Asbestos Workers v.
Volger, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) and in other circuits. See Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971). This decision seems to cast serious doubt on the future
use of quotas in the Fifth Circuit, leaving it completely within the trial court's discre-
tion, which order will not be disturbed unless clearly inadequate on its face or once
put into operattion, it is not sufficient to end the discrimination.
48. See the excellent discussion in Note, 56 MINN. L. REV. 842, 855 (1972).
49. Id.
50. 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973).
51. 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
52. Id. at 129.
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mula being left to the district judge.53 Again no distinction was drawn
between quotas in supervisory positions and entry level quotas.
The Second Circuit has distinguished the two types of quotas in
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc., v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv-
ice Commission.54 The district court's order creating a minority pool
of qualified applicants to fill vacancies in the rank of patrolman on a
quota basis was upheld. The court held that the district court abused
its discretion in finding that the promotion test was discriminatory
and also held that the imposition of quotas on ranks above patrolman
would discriminate against whites who had embarked on a police
career with expectation of advancement and would only exacerbate
rather than decrease racial discrimination.55 Similarly, in Chance v.
Board of Examiners,5" the use of discriminatory promotion tests was
enjoined and the New York School Board was allowed to fill vacancies
in supervisory positions without regard to race. A minority quota was
rejected in these positions because of the district court's reasoning
that the Constitution did not require quotas in supervisory positions,
and that there was a need for having the best possible people in these
positions. 51 It was noted that only a minority of the population has
the requisite qualifications for the jobs, and that a valid exam should
indicate these people irrespective of race.5" Quotas in entry level posi-
tions can be justified on the ground that they allow the minority
applicant a chance to get a job, and he can then prove himself as any
other worker. The applicant passed over for the entry level position
need not necessarily know the minority worker who was preferred
over him. The applicant passed over still has a good chance of obtain-
ing the job because the minority applicants are preferred on an alter-
nating basis, and usually there are more entry level positions avail-
able than supervisory positions. The minority member will be enter-
ing the work force in an equal position and if there is resentment on
the part of his fellow employees, it need not be personal resentment
as they were not themselves deprived of a position in order to hire the
minority applicant. At the supervisory level the problems escalate.
The non-minority applicant will probably know who was promoted
over him because both will probably still be with the employer. Even
where the minority applicant has superior qualifications, if he was
53. Id. at 130.
54. 5 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 1344 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. Id. at 1350. As an alternative approach the court suggested that time in grade
and seniority requirements for promotions might be decreased.
56. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
57. Id. at 1179.
58. Id.
19741
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appointed under a quota system, the implication would always be
that the choice was made strictly on a racial basis. Thus, the minority
supervisor might be the target of resentment on the part of those
working for him. When minority employees are suing for equal access
to supervisory positions, this usually presupposes their presence in
the entry level positions in some number, and hence discrimination
may be absent on that level. But if discrimination should exist on
both levels, as in Bridgeport, the court might order quotas in the
entry level to achieve demographic parity if the situation is serious
enough to warrant such relief. The court should eliminate the cause
of the discrimination in the supervisory level, and rely on the inevita-
ble psychological pressure generated by this order and the provisions
of the Act to achieve minority representation in these positions. The
employer could draw from the entry level positions to fill vacancies
in the supervisory positions. The imposition of quotas here might
reach the point of diminishing returns. The Bridgeport-Chance
approach will eventually eliminate the present effects of past dis-
crimination in a less objectionable fashion and is, therefore, prefera-
ble.
Cases arising under Executive Order 11246"9 have also upheld
minority employment quotas. Section 202 of the Order requires that
the contractors and subcontractors on federal work projects not dis-
criminate in hiring and also calls for "affirmative action" to insure
non-discrimination.'" The validity of the Order was upheld in
Contractor's Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Schultz," in
which the Philadelphia Plan, calling for contractors in that area to
make good faith efforts to meet minority employment "goals" rang-
ing from nineteen to twenty-six percent in six trades where the per-
centage of black workers was one percent and the black population
of the city was thirty percent, was approved. The Plan was to elimi-
nate the present effects of past discrimination, and the court as-
sumed, that the paucity of blacks in the work force was due to the
exclusionary practices of the unions as there were available black
workers. 2 Due process was not violated as there would be no adverse
effect on white workers because the labor market was transitory and
workers were usually in short supply. 3 The court also seemed influ-
enced by the fact that all the Plan called for was good faith efforts to
59. 3 C.F.R. § 402 (1970).
60. The Order applies to government construction contracts and government sup-
ply contracts.
61. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
62. Id. at 176.
63. Id.
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meet the "flexible goals," as opposed to "fixed quotas." The Plan
involved some reverse discrimination. If an employer was faced with
an equally qualified black and a white, and he needs to show good
faith efforts to employ blacks in order to keep his contract,64 the
psychological pressure could likely operate in favor of the black, since
there is no better evidence of a good faith effort than the actual
presence of blacks in the work force." The Order was held not incon-
sistant with Title VII as Title VII is also color conscious.16 Section
703(j) was held to be a limitation on Title VIl only. 6 The court held
that the fifth amendment did not bar the Plan as the federal govern-
ment has a cost and performance interest in remedying the absence
of blacks in these trades and that the President has the power to
effectuate this interest through the Executive Order." Other courts
have used similar reasoning in upholding like plans. 9
Robert C. Lowe
64. Section 202(6) provides that the contract may be cancelled for non-
compliance. The contractor may also be declared ineligible for future government
contracts.
65. See Note, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 678, 692 (1970).
66. 442 F.2d at 173.
67. Id. at 172.
68. Id. at 177.
69. Associated Gen. Cont. v. Altshuler, 6 BNA F.E.P. Cas. 1013 (1st Cir. 1973).
The court upheld the constitutionality of a Massachusetts plan calling for an employer
to take "every possible measure" to fill minority goals of twenty percent on a federally
financed construction project. The plan goes further than did the Philadelphia Plan
as it required more than good faith efforts. The court upheld the Plan against an attack
that it violated the equal protection clause as there was a compelling need to remedy
a glaring imbalance in the number of blacks involved in the building trades industry
as opposed to the number available and found that quotas were related to this desired
end as they were not unrealistically set. Southern Ill. Build. Ass'n v. Oglive, 471 F.2d
680 (7th Cir. 1972); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970); Weiner v.
Cuyahoga Comm. College Dist., 249 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004
(1969).
